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Abstract:  A partial equilibrium model is used to examine the international production
allocation of a two-plant risk averse multinational firm which is confronted with
uncertainty with respect to foreign sales.  The firm has price-discriminating monopoly
power in both markets and uses specific factors in both plants, producing an identical
good.  We focus on the question how unequal insurance facilities in the firm’s home
and host market influence the firm’s international production decision and its level of
intra-firm trade.
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Introduction
The transformed economies in Eastern Europe the rapidly growing tiger economies in
South East Asia have been attracting increasing investment from Western economies.
Many multinational enterprises (MNEs) have opened or expanded foreign plants in
those new markets, a phenomenon exacerbated by agglomeration powers (as
described by the new economic geography models; Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1994;
Krugman and Venables, 1995) emerging in these markets.  However, apart from their
large growth potential, these popular investment areas, unlike Western economies,
often still have relatively poorly developed capital and credit markets.  In addition,
business financing institutions which are important for companies’ risk management,
such as private or public insurance institutions, are practically non-existent. Therefore,
these new economic regions are particularly attractive to MNEs, who can be present in
those markets through a local plant, while still continuing production in the home
plant, thereby limiting their exposure to risk in the foreign market.
This paper examines how the absence or incompleteness of credit and insurance
markets in the host country influences the international production allocation and
sales decision of a two-plant MNE which faces uncertainty in the form of commercial
risk with respect to its sales in the foreign market.  Commercial risk is related to the
use of export credits, which grant the foreign buyer defer of payment.  Because of the
inherent risk of default, firms usually desire to insure these contracts.  While insurance
is typically unavailable in the new investment zones, most OECD-countries offer
export insurance covering against the risk of default.  What is more, these insurance
schemes are also provided and supported by the government.  As a result, these
programmes often are subject to considerable lobbying from domestic vested interest
groups, especially because this potential channel of protection remains fairly hidden
(Abraham, Couwenberg and Dewit, 1992; Dewit, 1996).  Meanwhile, the use of
export credits has become increasingly important in trade relations with these specific
economies (Kuhn, Horvath and Jarvis, 1995).
Our analysis will also focus on  how this asymmetry in insurance facilities between
the MNE’s home and host market will affect inter-subsidiary trade.  Inter-affiliate2
trade is extensively researched in the literature (Caves, 1996, p.33) and is estimated to
account for one third of total trade (UNCTC, 1988, p.92).  A general finding in the
literature is that there exists a complementarity between intra-firm trade and the size
of the foreign plant (e.g. van den Bulcke, 1985; MacCharles, 1987; Willmore, 1992,
as mentioned by Caves, 1996, p.33).  For instance, if the home plant is exporting to
the foreign plant, the export volume is likely to increase as the size of the foreign plant
expands.
It will be argued that, without insurance in the foreign market and efficient insurance
in the domestic economy, the foreign commercial risk augments the size of the
domestic plant beyond its certainty-equivalent, while the opposite is true for the
foreign plant.  However, with official insurance schemes in the home country being
subsidised, the foreign plant may expand as well, and even surpass its certainty-
equivalent size.  It will be shown that the latter effect will prevail if the MNE’s degree
of risk aversion is sufficiently small.  These results will shed light on some important
political economy issues.
The first section of the paper addresses the production and sales decisions of a price-
discriminating monopolistic two-plant MNE facing commercial risk in the foreign
market. The analytical set-up is akin to partial-equilibrium models addressing the
connection between MNEs’ financial and production decisions on the one hand and
imperfections in capital markets on the other hand (Calderon-Rossell, 1985; Itagaki,
1991; Broll and Zilcha, 1992).  The effects of domestic coverage facilities on the
MNE’s distribution of production and sales decisions are examined in section two.
Section three focuses on how empirically observed features of official export risk
management institutions may co-determine the respective sizes of the domestic and
foreign plant and the level of trade between a MNE’s subsidiaries. Section four
incorporates a moral hazard element into the MNE-framework and investigates how
operating in two markets with unequally developed insurance markets affects firms’
own efforts in risk management.  The final section summarises the main conclusions.3
1.  The multinational firm and commercial risk in the host market
Consider a monopolistic MNE with a domestic and a foreign plant, exercising price
discriminating power in both markets. Both plants are producing a (non-zero quantity
of an) identical good.  Production requires a single specific factor, formally captured
by increasing marginal costs. In spite of the additional costs incurred by setting up a
foreign plant, demand in the foreign market is sufficiently large, allowing the firm to
limit the high costs associated with an otherwise larger-scale domestic plant.
Attention is focused on the production and sales allocation between the two markets,
with the difference between local production and local sales determining the level of
intra-firm trade within the MNE. Depending on the relative cost and demand
differences between the markets, the home plant is a net-exporter to or a net-importer
from the foreign subsidiary.
The assumption of both plants producing an identical good is not crucial. It merely
implies that there will only be one-way trade in the model, while differentiated
products are likely to create two-way trade between subsidiaries.  The qualitative
results regarding the MNE’s output and sales decisions under uncertainty and
asymmetrically developed insurance in both markets remain valid.  In addition,
production may also involve non-specific factors.  As long as the firm uses at least
one specific factor, thereby generating increasing marginal costs of production, the
results of the model will hold.
The firm’s sales contracts with foreign buyers stipulate a credit term, thereby allowing
the buyer to defer payment for the period specified.  Such type of contracts are
especially essential when operating in newly emerging markets, since capital markets
there often are underdeveloped, inefficient or even totally absent.  However, this
particular mode of payment implies that the firm is confronted with commercial risk
in the foreign market, implying that its foreign sales revenues will be potentially
reduced due to (partial or complete) default by the foreign customer.  The defaulted
fraction of the contract is represented by the stochastic variable l (with
0 1 < £ £ £ a b l ).4
With probability a  the firm loses part of the value of its foreign contract as a result of
its exposure to commercial risk. The MNE’s local presence in the foreign market is
likely to reduce the probability of default it is facing, since it may have more
information about the creditworthiness of individual buyers by its direct inclusion in
the local business network.  Yet, given the firm’s location, we assume for now that
this probability is exogenously given to the MNE
1. The MNE’s total expected profits




p a p a p l l l = - + z ( ) 1 0 (1)
with p 0 = + - - R q R q C x C x ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) (2a)
p l l = + - - - R q R q C x C x ( ) ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) 1 (2b)
and x x q q + = + * * (3)
p 0 stands for the firm’s total profits if the foreign customer pays the sum contracted
when the credit term expires, while p lrepresents profits when the foreign buyer
defaults.  The discount factor is set equal to one.   xand x* respectively reflect
production in the domestic and the foreign plant, whereas qand q* are denoting sales
in those markets.  R q ( ) is the price discriminating MNE’s revenue function in the
domestic market, and C x ( )is the production cost function of the domestic plant (with
C x '( ) > 0 and C x ''( ) > 0)
2.  The starred functions reflect the equivalent functions for
the foreign plant.  There is no uncertainty with respect to domestic revenue, nor is
there any other source of uncertainty included in the model.
2. Foreign commercial risk and the international production and sales allocation
Before discussing the effects of the existence of unbalanced risk management
facilities between the MNE’s home and host market, we examine the effect of foreign
payment uncertainty on a risk averse MNE’s decisions.  In other words, the impact of
                                                          
1 This assumption will be altered in section 4, where moral hazard will be discussed.
2 Since the location decision itself is given, we ignore the costs of setting up a plant.5
foreign commercial risk on production, sales and hence intra-firm trade is assessed
when turning to risk management institutions for insurance is impossible.
A risk averse MNE maximises its expected utility accruing from profits.  Its utility
function is of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type, with U'( ) p > 0 and U''( ) p < 0.
Given that total sales have to equal total output (q q x x + = + * *), sales and output
levels under uncertainty (symbolised by subscript r) are optimally distributed across
markets, or
max ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
* * x x q r r r
EU U EU = - + 1 0 a p a p l   with q x x q r r r r = + -
* * (4)
and EU U f d
a
b
( ) ( ) p p l l l l =z
The first order conditions obtained from the maximisation procedure reduce to:
R q C x r r '( ) '( ) = (5a)
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The MNE’s optimal production decision implies that the marginal costs of production
in the two plants are equal (which follows from combining expressions (5a) and (5b)),
while equalisation of marginal revenues in both markets guarantees an optimal sales
decision (expression (5c)).  Optimal values for xr,  xr
* and qr
* are determined by (5a-
c) and the value for qr follows from the sales-production equality.
As a benchmark, we derive the certainty-equivalent production and sales values
(symbolised by subscript c), with a l E  representing the certainty-equivalent payment-
loss.  Then, the two-plant MNE maximises certainty-equivalent profits ( Ep ), or
max ( ) ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *)
, ,
* * x x q c c c
E R q E R q C x C x p a l = + - - - 1 (6)
with q x x q c c c c = + -
* *
Solving the optimisation problem in (6) yields the following (rearranged) first order
conditions:6
R q C x c c '( ) '( ) = (7a)
R q C x c c '( ) *'( )
* = (7b)
R q E R q c c '( ) ( ) *'( )
* = - 1 a l (7c)
Proposition 1: With foreign commercial risk, a two-plant risk averse MNE using a
specific factor, (i) sells more in the domestic market, (ii) sells less in the foreign
market and (iii) produces less in both locations than under the certainty-equivalent.
Proof:
Suppose  x x r c ‡ .  Then, from (5a) and (7a), we know that q q r c £ and hence







l >1 and cov( '( ), ) U p l l > 0, we
know from (5c) and (7c) that q q r c £ implies that q q r c * * < .  However, the sales-
production equality (q q x x + = + * *) implies q q r c * * > .  Hence,  x x r c ‡  is violated
and x x r c <  has to be true .  Therefore,  x x r c * * < , q q r c >  and q q r c * * < .
Corollary: With foreign commercial risk, a risk averse MNE’s foreign plant will be a
net-exporter (net-importer) to (from) the home plant at smaller (larger)  differences in
production costs and local demand between both markets than under the certainty-
equivalent.
Proof:
(i)  Suppose production costs and local demand in the two markets imply that the
equilibrium certainty-equivalent level of local production is equal to the level of
local sales in both markets (x q c c = , x q c c
* * = ). From proposition 1, we then know
x q q x q x x q r r r r c c c c - = - < - = - = * * * * 0.  Hence,  x q r r * * > .
(ii)  Suppose  x q r r = and x q r r
* * = .  By a similar reasoning to (i), we then know x q c c
* * < .
Suppose that the home plant initially is a net-exporter of the good produced by the
MNE.  Then, a positive technology or negative local demand shock in the foreign
market  is more likely to lead to a trade pattern reversal under uncertainty than in the7
certainty-equivalent case.  Unlike under certainty, the MNE discounts its ‘uncertain’
foreign sales revenues by its degree of risk aversion while no risk is incurred on
domestic sales revenues.  Consequently, foreign sales are smaller than under certainty.
It also implies that the uncertainty suppresses the risk-adjusted foreign price below the
price prevailing in the domestic market, inducing the MNE to export to the domestic
market from its foreign subsidiary, thereby equalising marginal revenues across
markets.  Thus, the uncertainty raises the volume of intra-firm trade from the foreign
to the domestic plant
3.
Alternatively, if no exogenous shocks occur and the domestic plant remains a net-
exporter, uncertainty in the foreign market reduces the level of intra-firm trade.  When
the risk averse MNE sells less than the certainty-equivalent in the foreign market, this
does not only mean that it produces less locally, but also that the part of the
production in the domestic plant intended for export to the foreign market decreases.
Conversely, the firm prefers to make up for its loss in foreign sales by selling more in
the risk-free domestic market.
The absence of insurance implies that the first-best risk allocation cannot be obtained,
indicating that total welfare is smaller than under certainty.  The uncertainty does not
only reduce economic rents but also redistributes these across groups of economic
agents.  First, domestic consumers would benefit from the absence of insurance
facilities as the domestic price falls with the additional output directed to local
demand.  The uncertainty in the foreign market reduces the domestic market power of
the MNE, which is reflected in the domestic price and sales level moving closer
towards the certainty-equivalent perfectly competitive values.  In that respect, the
absence of insurance has a positive effect on domestic welfare, seemingly rendering
the domestic industry more competitive.  Second, unlike home consumers, domestic
specific factors are harmed by the uncertainty in the foreign market.  Since “certain”
home sales are valued higher by a risk averse MNE than “risky” foreign sales, the
higher level of home sales will not compensate for the foreign sales reduction.  So, the
                                                          
3 If the foreign market is sufficiently large and has no relative cost advantage, firms using specific
factors, having constant marginal costs of production, will either produce total output in the foreign
(single) plant and export to the domestic market, or, if the domestic market is sufficiently large, produce
the sales for each market in a local plant (i.e., intra-firm trade is zero).8
risk in the foreign market spills over into the home market via a downsizing of the
domestic plant.  As a result, employment and returns of specific factors are being
diminished.  Third, with the uncertainty in the foreign market reducing the total size
of the MNE, both the interests of corporate leadership and specific factors are
negatively affected.  Finally, consumers and specific factors in the foreign market are
worse off as well, with foreign sales and production levels remaining well below the
certainty-equivalent values.
So far we assumed that the firm had no access to risk management instruments or
institutions.  Most transitional economies as well as the new Asian tiger economies
indeed exhibit a striking lack of a whole range of insurance and hedging mechanisms.
Conversely, insurance facilities usually are in abundance in Western highly developed
market economies.  The next section addresses the question how the asymmetric
availability of coverage institutions in both locations affects the MNE’s international
production and sales allocation, and hence the different interest groups in both
markets.
3.  The MNE with foreign commercial risk and domestic insurance
In most OECD-countries, exporters facing commercial risk of default can purchase
insurance against this type of risk. Private insurance companies only insure relatively
safe contracts
4, yet firms with risky export contracts can turn to the public domestic
export insurance for coverage.  If the default risk is linked to the export activity of the
firm, an export insurance contract will remove (at least part of) this uncertainty.  Such
policies are offered both by private and official companies, although in most countries
the latter mainly account for insurance contracts covering the most risky export
markets.  We examine how and to what extent the MNE’s decisions in terms of risk
management on the one hand and its output and sales choices on the other hand
interact.
                                                          
4 Insurance markets for foreign commercial risk are usually absent or incomplete due to moral hazard
problems.9
Assume the domestic plant is a net-exporter to the foreign subsidiary. With th
availability of domestic export insurance, profits include the costs and benefits of
acquiring risk coverage and are given by
p r 0 = + - - - R q R q C x C x I ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) (8a)
p l l r l = + - - - + - R q R q C x C x I ( ) ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) ( ) 1 (8b)
r symbolises the export insurance premium per currency unit insured, and  I  is the
sum covered by insurance.  If the foreign importer defaults (and p l is realised), the
fraction of the export contract which remained unpaid will be reimbursed by the
domestic insurance company to the extent that coverage is taken (i.e., lI ).  Evidently,
if full payment is received when the credit expires (and p 0 is realised), no claim
payment will be made.  Only foreign sales which are exported from the domestic
economy are eligible for coverage by export insurance.  Hence, the following
constraint needs to be added to the utility maximisation problem formulated in (4):
I R q p q x £ - *( *) *( *) * (9)
p* stands for the price in the foreign market and the right hand side of (9) is equal to
the value of the MNE’s exports to the foreign market. Since firms are legally
prohibited to buy more than a hundred percentage insurance, the insured amount
cannot exceed the sum stipulated in the export contract.  In addition to sales and
output variables, the firm now also maximises its utility with respect to the risk
management variable,  I , which ultimately yields the following first order conditions:
R q C x I I '( ) '( ) = (10a)
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(10c)
and
 if j = 0, then r a
p l p l
p
l l =
+ EU E U
EU
'( ) cov( '( ), )
'( )
  (10d)
and I R q p q x < - *( *) *( *) *; (10e)
if j a p l a p l r p l l = + - > EU E U EU '( ) cov( '( ), ) '( ) 0, (10f)10
  then  I R q p q x = - *( *) *( *) * (10g)
j  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the coverage constraint in (9).  Naturally,
the cost of insurance, represented by the premium rate r , is crucial in the firm’s
insurance decision and hence essential to the output and sales allocation between its
two plants.
Figure 1 depicts what happens to the risk averse MNE’s output and sales variables
( xI , xI
*, qI and qI
*) with domestic export insurance for different premium rates.  Both
the certainty-equivalent values (xc, xc
*, qcand qc
*) as the levels when the risk averse
MNE bears the full extent of the foreign commercial risk ( xr, xr
*, qrand qr
*) are
indicated in the graphs.  Premium rate values for which the export insurance
constraint is not binding range within the interval ]rjﬁ0, rI=0[.
rI=0 symbolises the prohibitive premium rate, entailing a tax which is too high for the
MNE to buy insurance. In that case, the output and sales decisions of the MNE
evidently take precisely the same values as without the availability of risk
management mechanisms (x x I r = = 0   , x x I r = = 0* *,q q I r = = 0   ,q q I r = = 0* *).
Proposition 2: When insurance is absent in the host country but available in the
domestic market, an intra-MNE trade reversal with the home plant becoming a net-
importer instead of a net-exporter requires larger relative cost and demand
differences than under uncertainty.
Proof:
Suppose  x q r r = .  Then, from (7a-c) and (9a-c) we know  x x I r >  and q q I r < .  Hence
x q x q I I r r - > - , implying  x q I I > .
Export insurance in the home market will augment the risk averse firm’s valuation of
foreign sales which are produced, and therefore at least partially insured, in the home
market.  Hence, even when there are no cost or demand differences between the11
markets, the firm will prefer to serve part of the host market through export from the
home plant.
3.1. Multinationals with domestic insurance and the separation theorem
Traditionally, a separation theorem holds between an insured firm’s coverage on the
one hand and its output and sales decision on the other hand
5.  The theorem states that
a risk averse firm’s output (sales) decisions are independent from its degree of risk
aversion and the distribution characteristics of the stochastic variable. Output
decisions are merely determined by the prevailing insurance premium rate.  Still, this
is no longer unambiguously true for a MNE operating in two markets with
asymmetrically developed insurance markets.
Proposition 3:  When insurance is absent in the host country but available in the
domestic market, (i) there exists a critical premium rate (r ) in the domestic market
below which the separation theorem breaks down for a two-plant risk averse MNE
with specific factors and (ii) this critical premium rate entails an insurance tax.
Proof:
(i)  Let r a l = + E k , k > 0 with a l a
p l p l
p




+ '( ) cov( '( ), )
'( )
(see
(10d)).  Then, j = 0 and expressions (10a-c) are independent of the utility function
and the distribution features of the default variable.  However, at k = 0, the left
hand side of (10d) is smaller than the right hand side, implying j > 0.  Substituting
(10f) into (10a-c) shows that the utility function and the distribution features of the
default variable now determine the firm’s output and sales decisions.
(ii)  From (i) we know  j > 0 at k = 0 and j = 0 for some k > 0.  Hence, $ k > 0,
determining r  at which j ﬁ 0.
                                                          
5 This result has been established in several different set-ups of decision making under uncertainty,
among others by Holthausen, 1979; Katz en Paroush, 1979; Feder, Just en Schmitz, 1980; Funatsu,
1986; Viaene en de Vries, 1992; Broll en Zilcha, 1992; Dewit, 1996.12
In Figure 1 the full export credit coverage constraint is not binding (j = 0), for
premium rates in the interval  ]rjﬁ0, rI=0[, implying that for those values the
separation theorem holds.  As the premium rate decreases below the prohibitive rate,
the firm purchases insurance but does not cover its export contract completely
( I R q p q x I I I < - *( ) *( )
* * *).  Then, the MNE’s optimal decisions are implied by first
order conditions (10a-e).  We know that in the range considered the premium rate
charged is higher than the fair rate at which premium income is equal to expected
claim payments (r a l = E ).  Intuitively, since for the range of premium rates involved
the separation theorem holds, the insurance decision affects output and sales through
the premium rate only.  Since the latter is higher that the certainty-equivalent
payment-loss and lower than the prohibitive rate, output and sales with non-binding
insurance necessarily take values between the certainty and uncertainty outcomes.
Comparing (10a-c with j = 0) to (5a-c) and (7a-c) shows that this is true at a
premium which is sufficiently high but smaller than the no-insurance premium level.
This effect will be labelled henceforth as the direct insurance effect.
Yet, this does no longer hold unambiguously at premium rates for which the insurance
constraint does become binding (j > 0).  Then, any risk averse MNE chooses to fully
cover against the uncertainty incurred on foreign sales, but can only do so for the
fraction of foreign sales produced in the domestic subsidiary and exported to the
foreign plant.  As a result, the MNE is induced to shift back part of the production
from the foreign to the domestic plant, which allows the firm to cover more of the
foreign sales by export insurance available in the domestic market.  We refer to the
latter mechanism as the indirect insurance effect.  As the firm is more risk averse and
the uncertainty with respect to foreign default increases (e.g., reflected by an mean-
preserving spread of the distribution), this effect is stronger.  It is entirely generated by
the breakdown of the separation theorem, caused in turn by the asymmetric insurance
facilities between the MNE’s home and the host market
6.
                                                          
6 If the firm relies on non-specific inputs and has constant marginal costs, output and sales decisions
will depend on its degree of risk aversion and the features of the default distribution only if the firm has
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Corollary :  With efficient insurance (i.e., r a l = E ) in the home country and no
insurance in the host country, a risk averse MNE with specific factors will (i) produce
more and sell less in its domestic plant, (ii) produce less in its foreign plant and (iii)
trade more between its subsidiaries than under the certainty-equivalent.
Proof:
From proof (ii) of proposition 3, we know that j > 0 at r a l = E .
(i)  Suppose  x x I c £  at r a l = E .  This implies that q q I c ‡ (see (10a) and (7a)),
x x I c * * <  (see (10b) and (7b), and q q I c * * > (see (10c) and (7c)).  Again, this
violates the sales-production identity according to which q q I c < .   Hence,
x x I c > and q q I c < .
 
(ii)  Suppose  x x I c * * ‡ .  This implies that q q I c * * < (see (10b-c) and (7b-c)) and that
x x I c > (see (10a-b) and (7a-b)), implying q q I c < (see (10a) and (7a)).  Yet, this
violates the sales-production identity according to which q q I c >  if  x x I c * * ‡ ,
q q I c * * < and x x I c > .  Hence,  x x I c * * < .
 
(iii)  Since  x x I c > and q q I c <  (see (i)), x q x q I I c c - > - .
Efficient risk management institutions provide insurance at a premium which matches
the expected loss, which is generally referred to as a fair premium.  At that rate, output
in the domestic subsidiary exceeds the certainty level. While the direct insurance
effect brings the domestic output up to the certainty-equivalent, the indirect effect
guarantees that the former exceeds the latter.  Hence, domestic specific interests will
prefer uncertainty in the foreign market with asymmetric insurance facilities to the
certainty case.   The converse is true for local domestic consumers.  While they
obviously gained from the uncertainty in the foreign market compared to certainty,
they will lose out in a situation where insurance markets are unequally developed with
efficient insurance in the home market.  Compared to the latter case, they are better of
under certainty.  Since marginal costs of production in the domestic plant have15
increased beyond the certainty level, the MNE reduces its sales in the local domestic
market below the certainty-equivalent.
The combination of these two effects implies that at a fair domestic export insurance
premium, the MNE’s intra-firm trade volume rises above the certainty-equivalent.
Alternatively, intra-firm trade of a risk averse MNE with export insurance facilities
equals intra-firm trade under certainty at a premium exceeding the fair rate.
The direct and indirect insurance effect of the availability of risk management options
in the domestic market affect the production level in the foreign plant in opposite
ways.  Directly, the reduction in uncertainty carried by the MNE generates a positive
spill-over on production in the foreign subsidiary.  This explains why the level of the
MNE’s foreign production is situated above the level without any coverage facilities
in the domestic market (x x I r
* * > ).  However, since the uncertainty cannot be
transferred completely and because of the MNE’s tendency to reallocate part of the
foreign production to the home market (i.e., the indirect insurance effect), foreign
production remains below the certainty level (x x I c
* * < ).  Clearly, with fairly rated
domestic export insurance, specific factors in the foreign market will prefer the
certainty case to a situation where insurance facilities between the countries are
unequal.
The preferences of the MNE are in line with the interests of specific factors in the
home plant insofar that the firm prefers asymmetric regional insurance facilities with
efficient insurance at home to the symmetric case where insurance is unavailable in
both markets.  Yet, the fact that no insurance is available in the host market makes
this situation still inferior to the certainty case in the MNE’s ranking, while the
converse is true for domestic specific factors.
With intra-firm export to the foreign market rising and local production in the foreign
plant moving in the opposite direction, the total effect of an efficient insurance market
in the home country on total foreign sales is ambiguous.  Yet, if marginal costs in the
home plant are increasing sharply with an expansion of production, the latter will be16
limited and the increase in the MNE’s exports to the foreign market is likely to be
more than compensated by the cut-down in foreign production (implying q q I c
* * < ).
Hence, it is a priori unclear whether local consumers in the host market will gain or
suffer from this particular asymmetry in insurance facilities.
The trajectory followed by the risk averse decision variables with domestic insurance
programmes which are at least break-even is reflected in Figure 1 between the
premium rate values of ra l E  and rI=0.  Note that, for this premium range, although
production in the foreign plant is unmistakably smaller than the certainty-equivalent
level, this does not necessarily mean that it is a negative function of the risk coverage
cost, r .  The latter is only true as long as the coverage constraint is not binding
(j = 0).  Once the firm is constrained in its insurance decision (j > 0), foreign
production may either increase or decrease with the premium rate, depending on the
relative magnitudes of the direct versus the indirect insurance effect.  However, for the
entire premium range, total foreign sales will unambiguously increase as the premium
rate goes down.
3.2. Multinationals, regional asymmetries in insurance and insurance subsidisation
In this section, we examine how a determinant of a risk averse MNE’s production and
sales allocation between two markets is affected if insurance is provided in the
domestic market at a rate below the fair premium.  The fact that the zero-profit
premium rate often is no longer a lower bound if public risk management institutions
enter into the picture is well documented in empirical studies (Abraham, 1992; Kuhn,
Horvath and Jarvis, 1995; Dewit, 1996).  The latter reveal that these officially
supported institutions are often operating with a loss.  The WTO’s Subsidy-Code
explicitly prohibits this practice and defines it as export credit insurance subsidisation.
Technically, it refers to the fact that the agencies’ premium income is insufficient to
match the claims resulting from the underwritten contracts (i.e., r E <a l ).17
The fact that export credits to Eastern Europe and the new Asian tiger economies have
drastically risen both in absolute value and in terms of the fraction of total officially
insured contracts mounts the question how the use of official credits at extremely
favourable rates affects the MNE’s decisions.  Although it probably does not affect the
location decision itself
7, this type of subsidisation will clearly affect the export
decision of a MNE, and also the output allocation between its two plants.
Officially subsidised insurance schemes do not only relieve the MNE entirely from the
commercial risk on its exported products but also grant an extra monetary benefit to
the insured MNE.  Hence, if the subsidy is sufficiently high, the insured MNE’s utility
level reaches or even surpasses its certainty-equivalent.  Since its expected claims
exceed the insurance costs incurred for purchasing risk coverage, a risk averse MNE
now increases its domestic production targeted to the export market (x q s s - ) even
more than with an efficient private insurance market (x q s s - >x q E E r a l r a l = = - ).
Alternatively, the direct and indirect insurance effect are now being reinforced by the
subsidy effect.
Proposition 4:  With subsidised official insurance in the home market and no
insurance facilities in the host market, a risk averse MNE using specific factors
(i)  always expands its domestic plant beyond the certainty-equivalent;
(ii)   expands its foreign plant beyond the certainty-equivalent if its degree of risk
aversion is sufficiently low.
Proof:
(i)  x x I E c ,r a l < > .  Proof analogous to proof (i) of corrolary of proposition 3.
(ii)  x x I E c ,
* *
r a l < >  implies C x C x I E c *'( ) *'( ) ,
* *
r a l < > .  From (10a-b) and (7a-b) we obtain,
after rearranging terms, that for x x I E c ,
* *
r a l < > , the following condition has to hold:
C x C x
EU
p q I E c I E '( ) '( )
'( )
*( ) , ,
*
r a l r a l
j
p
< < - > .  As 
j
p EU'( )
 increases with the
degree of risk aversion (see (10f)), this condition is more likely to be violated if the
                                                          
7 This is the reason why the location decision is not endogenous in the model.18
MNE is highly risk averse, thereby augmenting the right hand side of the
inequality.
If the asymmetry in insurance facilities between the two markets increases as a result
of the subsidisation of official insurance schemes in the home economy, it is not
unambiguous how the size of the foreign plant is affected.  The MNE is more likely to
expand its foreign plant if the increase in production costs generated by its expanding
domestic plant is too large to compensate for the benefit associated with more
insurance.  The latter scenario is highly probable if the MNE ‘s risk aversion is
relatively low.  Assuming decreasing risk aversion,  this outcome is most relevant for
large MNEs.  Conversely for relatively small MNEs, the power of attraction of newly
developing market economies may be mitigated by Western European governments
through the use of this type of official insurance schemes.  In particular, if the benefits
of risk management available in the home country exceed the marginal production
cost differential between the home and the foreign location, the MNE may even shut
down its foreign plant (xI*= 0 if 
j
p EU
p q C x C x I I I '( )
*( ) '( ) *'( )
* * > - )
8.  However,
given that it is usually the former type of MNE which will be located in newly
emerging but risky markets, we conclude that the size of the foreign plant may well
increase as a result of the export insurance subsidy in the domestic economy.  In that
case, both foreign consumers and foreign specific factors would welcome this policy.
4.  Export risk management and moral hazard
In general, the availability of insurance facilities usually is welfare improving since it
allows for a better risk allocation across economic agents, especially if the insurance
system is efficient.  However, while providing full insurance at fair premium rates is
the first-best scenario with symmetric information, this is no longer true if the
insurance market is plagued by problems of asymmetric information.  In the case of
export credit insurance and commercial risk, the problem of moral hazard is claimed
                                                          
8 This condition assumes set-up costs are zero.19
to be particularly relevant
9, especially since it prevents the existence of an efficient
market for export insurance.
In this section, the implications of moral hazard on a MNE with uninsurable
commercial risk on its foreign production is examined. In particular, attention is
focused on its implications with an unequally developed insurance market in the home
and host economy.  Up to now, we have assumed that the probability of commercial
default is exogenously given to the firm.  Suppose that this is not the case, but that the
firm can, by activities of its own, reduce this probability, while the actual loss in the
case of default remains unaffected by the firm’s actions.  These actions are called
“self-protection” activities (Winter, 1990), and entail, for instance, making sure that
foreign customers are creditworthy by, among other activities, checking the reputation
of the latter’s guarantees. Such investments will decrease the probability of occurrence
of default (or, a e '( ) < 0; in addition it is assumed that a e ''( ) > 0). Since investing in
these activities (represented by e ) are costly, the firm will avoid these when possible.
Thus, the moral hazard problem here refers to the disincentive the insured has to keep
the probability of default down.  For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of
self-protection activities is constant and equal to one.
Profits of the firm if full-payment is received and if default occurs are respectively
given by
p e 0 = + - - - R q R q C x C x ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) (11a)
p l e l = + - - - - R q R q C x C x ( ) ( ) *( *) ( ) *( *) 1 (11b)
The fact that firms can affect the probability of default by investing in self-protection
activities may confront risk management institutions, if unable to monitor the self-
protection of insured firms, with a problem of moral hazard.
This is clarified by examining self-protection of a two-plant MNE with specific
factors which can rely on well developed insurance markets both in the home and host
                                                          
9 For this reason, several official export insurance agencies only offer partial coverage, although the
deductible or uninsurable fraction of the contract usually is quite low.20
market
10. With insurance options now available in the host market, the MNE’s
optimisation problem  changes into:
  max ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )
, , , , *,
* * x x q I I I I I
EU U EU
e
l a e p a e p = - + 1 0   with q x x q I I I I = + -
* *      (12)
s.t. (i) I R q p q x £ - *( *) *( *) *
(ii)  I p q x * *( *) * £
(iii) xI ‡ 0; qI ‡ 0; qI
* ‡ 0;e ‡ 0
where (ii) stands for the full foreign coverage constraint, with I * denoting the
coverage sum taken in the foreign insurance market.
At fair premium rating, this would mean that first order conditions are equal to (10a-c)
with  I R q p q x = - *( *) *( *) * , I p q x * *( *) * =  and the first order condition for e is
equal to
- - = - + a e p p a e p a e p l l '( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) '( ) U EU U EU 0 0 1 b g (13)
At fair premium rating expression (13) reduces to 0 0 <U'( ) p , hence  e f = 0, where
e f denotes the value for e with full insurance coverage.  Alternatively, if premium
rates are fair, firms will take full insurance against foreign commercial risk, in the
domestic market for their exports and in the host market for the locally produced
sales.  The insurance facilities in the home and host market not only relieve the MNE
completely from the uncertainty burden, but also induce the firm not to invest in
precautionary actions to abate commercial risk.  As they will be reimbursed for any
potential payment loss, the firm loses the incentive to reduce the probability of a
default occurrence.
It is a well established result in the insurance literature (first pointed out by Shavell,
1979; Arnott, 1990; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1990) that this problem is partly alleviated if
the risk averse firm is left to some extent with uncertainty, which enforces some care-
taking behaviour by the (partially) insured.  Geographically asymmetrically developed
insurance facilities may generate this positive side-effect.
                                                          
10 This is not as much a real-life scenario as a mere benchmark for comparing the MNE’s investment in
self-protection with insurance opportunities in the host market being absent.21
Proposition 5: With MNEs of the home economy facing commercial risk in the foreign
host market, the absence of insurance markets in the host country mitigates moral
hazard problems in export insurance for insurance companies in the domestic
economy.
Proof:
Because of the absence of insurance facilities in the host market, we know that
U EU ( ) ( ) p p l 0 >  (for xI
* = 0).  Hence, expression (13) implies thate e p f > = 0,
where subscript p refers to the fact that only part of the uncertainty can be transferred.
Therefore, since a e '( ) < 0, we have a e a e ( ) ( ) p f < .
The non-insurable uncertainty associated with foreign sales produced in the host
market induces the firm to exercise caution and hence to invest in self-protection
activities before concluding contracts with customers in the foreign market.
Meanwhile, insurance companies in the home market know that the insured MNE is
not able to take full cover against the foreign commercial risk.  So, they also know the
MNE will invest in self-protection, whereas this would not be true for a single-plant
fully insured domestic firm.  Hence, the mere absence of an insurance market in the
MNE’s host market my reduce the need of domestic insurance companies for
designing insurance contracts for MNEs which are incentive compatible with self-
protection behaviour.  Hence, since moral hazard problems often limit insurance to
partial coverage, the absence of insurance facilities in the foreign market should
provide the MNE with more favourable export insurance contracts in the domestic
market.
5.  Conclusion
This paper assesses how sales and output decisions of a multinational with specific
factors are determined by unequally developed insurance facilities between its home
and host market, and thereby affect different economic interest groups in the domestic
and the foreign market. The conclusions that emerge from the analysis are particularly22
relevant for trade relations of Western economies with Eastern Europe and South East
Asia, both regions for which uncertainty is an essential issue, even more for its lack of
insurance markets.  The uncertainty in the model is caused by commercial risk with
respect to foreign sales, i.e., the risk of default when the foreign customer is allowed a
credit term.
The analysis suggests that in the complete absence of insurance, the uncertainty in the
foreign market would make domestic specific factors more vulnerable compared to
the case where the MNE operates in a safe foreign market.  More specifically,
compared to the certainty case, the MNE is more likely to choose its foreign plant
instead of its domestic one as its net-exporting basis.  However, if domestic export
insurance is available whereas no insurance facilities are available in the host market,
this intra-firm pattern of net-trade is likely to be the reverse.  Then, the commercial
risk in the foreign market generates an implicit subsidy for domestic production
factors, even if the MNE takes insurance at a fair premium rate.
This result hinges on the fact that for a wide range of domestic export insurance
premium rates, the traditional separation theorem regarding a risk averse firm’s
insurance decisions and its actions in the product market does not hold. This has
important implications for the different interest groups in the MNE’s home and the
host economy.
First, if export insurance is available at fair premium rates in the domestic market,
domestic factors of production prefer a situation of uncertainty with respect to foreign
sales to the certainty equivalent case.  With the absence of insurance facilities in the
host market, the size of the domestic subsidiary increases beyond its certainty-
equivalent level, and the same is true for the level of intra-firm trade.  The latter
implies that under these circumstances a trade pattern reversal with the domestic plant
becoming a net-importer instead of remaining a net-exporter is less likely to happen
with uncertainty about foreign sales than under certainty.  The importance of the
asymmetry in insurance provision is highlighted by the fact that the converse is true
when insurance is unavailable in both markets.23
Second, both domestic consumers and corporate leadership prefer certainty with
respect to foreign sales to efficient insurance in the home market only.  The expansion
of the domestic plant is reflected into higher exports while at the same time
production for the domestic market is reduced, which is translated into a higher price
for home consumers.  At the same time, the firm is worse off than under certainty and
would require an export insurance subsidy to reach the certainty-equivalent profit
level.  Hence, unlike domestic specific factors, both groups would welcome the
development of insurance markets in the foreign economy.  However, from a welfare
point of view, given that the MNE has price-setting power in the domestic market the
domestic economy would benefit from a small export insurance tax, even though such
a policy would merely rank as a third-best policy.  Alternatively, if insurance facilities
would be absent in the domestic economy as well, the uncertainty in the foreign
market would bring down prices in the domestic market.  This welfare effect is
reversed with efficient export insurance at home and no insurance facilities in the host
market.
Third, because export insurance is often provided by the government or an insurance
agency operating for the state, firms are likely to defend their vested interests by
lobbying for export insurance subsidisation.  This lobby tends to be strong, especially
as its power would be reinforced by the labour unions representing domestic factors of
production.  The domestic lobby may even be strengthened by the support of foreign
governments. This happens because, while foreign consumers would gain from a
subsidy-induced price reduction, even foreign specific factors may benefit from the
subsidies insurance schemes in the domestic market.  The latter effect will prevail if
the foreign market has a relatively large cost advantage and the uncertainty is not
excessive.  In that case, most economic groups in both markets would safeguard their
vested interests by preserving the currently existing asymmetry in insurance markets.
Finally, if the degree of uncertainty in the foreign market is (partly) endogenously
determined by the MNE’s behaviour, an undeveloped insurance market in the host
country reduces the moral hazard problem, which often lies at the core of thin or even
absent private export insurance markets.2425
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